E–pub Intensive Science Virtual Philosophy (Continuum Impacts)

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Intensive Science Virtual Philosophy (Continuum Impacts)Nda identifies his fundamental divide with Deleuze The term intensive which in my presentation was used in relation to individuation processes not the virtual continuum p 199 This philosophical divide for Delanda reuires a reconstruction in order to eliminate the confusion between the intensive virtual and his falsely individuated actual which thereby flattens his ontology in comparison to Deleuze Therefore all references to the individual are flattened by this exclusion of the virtual of intensities and lacks a robust philosophy of multiplicityAs we have seen above Delanda does well to identify the problematic of the anthropocentric concept of time However he goes on to say Unlike my reconstruction where the term individual refers to the final product organisms species etc in Deleuze s work it refers to the larval subject themselves It often has the meaning of a Leibnizian monad Delanda 2002 202 Delanda refers to Deleuze s robust larval selves as a Leibnizian monad which Delanda calls an intensive individual in contrast to the Delanda cogito of the individual Delanda defines the individual as without ualification to refer to the extended and ualified actual entities which form my flat ontology of individuals Delanda 2002 203 Then under a section entitled Extensities and ualities Delanda says These are the two characteristics which define the realm of the actual the fully constituted world of extended and ualified individuals Contradicting this focus on the actual he says In ATP these two characteristics are referred to as substances and forms respectively Given that no actual substance is every purely extensional these two characteristics are not really distinct They are the abstract components of every articulation Delanda 2002 203 Deleuze 1980 502 Conseuently Delanda opens the final chapter as stated above with his strong claim of a flat ontology of individuals where he has no room for reified totalities but only for concrete social individuals with the same ontological status as human individuals simply operating at larger spatio temporal scales products of concrete historical processes and operating as parts to a whole sic Where there are Cases Of Homogeneity To of homogeneity to the existence of a single culture or society one must not postulate such totalities but must be given a concrete historical explanation Delanda 2002 147Delanda thus becomes reductionistic of not only individuals and society but also of science by cutting off the second articulation of expression of the virtual and of philosophy itself In his attempt to avoid false totalization he states that science is a scientific field like any other individual which will depend on contingent historical facts such as its degree of internal homogeneity and its degree of isolation from other fields Delanda 2002 148 Delanda thus additionally reifies history while conflating under the category of individual the alloplastic of human individuals social individuals and culture It was precisely history while conflating under the category of individual the alloplastic of human individuals social individuals and culture It was precisely s project to provide a comprehensive integration of the physical organic and social in ATP and to bridge this gap of Delanda s flatened ontology Delanda goes on to state The ontology I have developed in this book is fully historical Each of the individuals which populates this other world is a product of a definite historical process of individuation and to the extent that an individual s iden. Ience explaining how Deleuze's system of thought is fundamental to a proper understanding of contemporary science from self organisation to non linear dynamics to complexity theor.

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L the three ontological dimensions which constitute the Deluzian world the virtual the intensive and the actual p 55 As no Deleuzian would ever make such a claim we can clearly see here Delanda s imposed metaphysics And he clearly rejects Deleuze s philosophy as applied to the socio linguistic domain in Chapter 4Deleuze Lite Chapter 4 Virtuality and the Laws of PhysicsDelanda reconstructs Deleuze for a scientific audience but then bifurcates virtual science from virtual philosophy according to his proclaimed flat ontology of individuals well defined as non hierachical by Delanda but which ontologically flattens a fully Deleuzian intensive philosophy of multiplicity which includes socio linguistic aspects of reality After taking us through three masterful chapters of Deleuzian philosophy applied to science Delanda declares at the beginning of Chapter Four There is no room for reified totalities no room for entities like society or culture Delanda 2002 147 in so doing he decapitates deleuze and In so doing he decapitates Deleuze and s DG sociological critiue of the historically reified totalities of both Freudian psychoanalysis and Marxian economics He also denies the alloplastic richness of Anti Oedipus AO and A Thousand Plateaus ATPHow does Delanda s cogent expositon of Deleuze s multiplicity in the scientific world so completely reject the multiplicity of Deluze s philosophical project We have a clue where Delanda states 1 Unlike spatio temporal dynamisms the terms passive self and larval subject received very little elaboration in my reconstruction mostly because I wanted to keep the description of Deleuze s ontology free from anthropocentrism as possible p 202 Delanda here is reacting to the potentially anthropocentic philosophy in Difference and Repetition DR and completely rejects the comprehensive philosophy of multiplicity of ATPDelanda is understandably concerned about the anthropological emphasis in Deleuze s three syntheses of time in Difference and Repetition which also has a parallel in the three syntheses of space The Deleuzian cogito reuires that the I that thinks be placed in time as the passive I Deleuze rejects the Kantian cogito which grounds determinability not only in time but in thinking which is secondary and illusory Time signifies a fault or a fracture in the I and a passivity in the self and the correlation between the passive self and the fractured I constitutes the discovery of the transcendental or the element of the true Copernican revolution Deleuze 1980 86 Deleluze exposes the I that is fractured based on the passive receptivity of the self rather than covering it up as does Kant with the synthetic apriori activity of the transcendental unity of apperception TUA Deleuze now searches for the condition of this wider existence what makes the undetermined ground the the condition of this wider existence what makes the undetermined ground the "I the passive self of a well determined given time determinable There is a dialectic interplay between the condition "the passive self of a well determined given time determinable There is a dialectic interplay between the condition a passive self with sensations and concepts and the given objects in time which Kant tries to cut off by appeal to the pure apriori given which are thereby separated from concepts and sensations Deleuze includes sensations and concepts in his cogito for which he must find the necessary conditions for particular sensations or concepts which is the basis for his third synthesis of time where the I dissolves in the virtual failure of the third synthesisDela. Reted Here Manuel DeLanda makes sense of Deleuze for both analytic and continental thought for both science and philosophy DeLanda focuses on the intersection of philosophy and sc.